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Japan has fascinated me for the last eight years. I first 
experienced Japan as a naive seventeen year-old exchange student 
living in humid Kokubunji, a suburb west of Tokyo. I returned to 
Utah and took Japanese classes at USU during my senior year of high 
school and freshman year of college. The next turn of events had 
me in Japan again, speaking the language for two years in the snow 
drifts of Hokkaido for two years. I was hooked. 
Having now been to Hong Kong, China and Japan, and having read 
much about the Far East, the Orient seems to be on my mind almost 
daily. I was even able to attend conferences in New York and Texas 
on U.S.-Japanese trade problems. But for all my individual effort 
on the subject, my greatest advances in studying Japan have come 
from school work during my junior and senior years in Logan. I 
credit Ed Glatfelter's class on Chinese history and his team-taught 
class with Bob Hoover on U.S. foreign policy in the Pacific as the 
motivation I needed to undertake an honors thesis centered on 
Japan. Dr. Glatfelter's advice and assistance has been very 
beneficial on this honors thesis project. 
Because of Dr.s Glatfelter and Hoover, my sources for 
knowledge of Japan expanded from Newsweek and Dan Rather to sources 
with deep understandings of and interest in Japan--writers like 
Yoshihashi, Nish, Reischauer, Neu, Young, Prestowitz, Fallows, 
Morely, Sun, and periodicals like The Far Eastern Economic Review, 
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The South China Morning Post, The Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, 
and Fortune. Yet all this study has only led me to the opinion 
that I am uneducated and have a long way to go. I will continue to 
study the language and gorge myself with books and newspaper and 
journal articles on Japan. I hope law school does not take away my 
thirst for an understanding of Japan. It shouldn't. 
I acknowledge my father, Doug Alder, another interested 
student of Japan, for being a sounding board of ideas, criticism 
and advice. My wife, Laurel Cannon Alder, has also been a 
tremendous support for my recent studies. 
I only regret not being able to spend more time on the 
project. I wish I had begun writing two years ago. I have found 
so much information recently but have been unable to graft it into 
the document. 
Japan, its people and culture, its present-day economic 
strength, its history, its dynamic future, has excited my 
intellectual curiosity. And yet, my fervor has not cast me as an 
advocate or adversary to these Japanese issues. As a result, the 
following honors thesis reflects objectivity. 
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR MILITARISTIC SEIZURE 
Was the founding of the State of Manchukuo an act of 
independence brought about by the people of Manchuria or a 
planned take-over by the Japanese military and government? Was 
Manchukuo a favored trading nation of Japan or just another 
province in an expanding Japanese empire? Answers to these 
questions are the motivation for this paper, and aim at the heart 
of Manchukuo's history. 
The title of this paper suggests that Japan established 
Manchukuo and did so because of economic development or 
militaristic reasons. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
Japan sought to influence Manchuria commercially with exports and 
investment, and as a result of the Treaty of Portsmouth and 
subsequent agreements with China, Japan established legitimate 
rights to control Manchuria. In the minds of the Japanese, 
Manchuria, as well as Korea, Taiwan and small islands in the 
South Pacific, became vital claims in Japan's hopes for the 
future. The question this paper addresses centers on the forces 
that brought about the State of Manchukuo. 
Japan had, since the late 1800s, viewed Manchuria as vital 
to Japan's national security and economic stability. Japan saw 
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China and Russia, as well as European imperialists, as having 
competing interests to Japan's in Manchuria. Because Japan's 
home islands could no longer support the agriculture to feed its 
rapidly increasing population, calls for expansion, whether 
commercial or territorial, came from all levels of society. 
Japan also had a deep desire to equal its status with Western 
nations, especially after suffering defeats by the Powers that 
many Japanese thought were racially motivated. 
This desire to grow and expand, in terms of Japan's 
commerce, military strengths, and in the size of its territory, 
caused, what Bamba Nobuya described as, Japan's diplomatic 
dilemma.' He questioned: should Japan negotiate and offer 
comity to nations in a modern diplomatic fashion in order to 
achieve its aims, or trust to its tradition and past, believe in 
its Imperial Way, put Japan above all other nations and do what 
is necessary, even if not popular, to secure its "inevitable" 
growth and power? The answer to this question forms a background 
framework for this paper. 
These conflicting methods of diplomacy defined the two camps 
that struggled for control throughout the Manchurian Crisis and 
through World War II. Bamba's comparison of "traditionalist" 
genro (samurai-descendent miliary leaders) and "modernist" 
diplomats helps one to conclude, as this paper does, that Tokyo 
foreign ministers (Tanaka in his last years, and Shidehara) and 
other heads of government were committed to long term economic 
development in Manchuria and modern diplomacy with China and the 
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world, but were ineffectual in controlling radical surges within 
the military. Thus, radical "traditionalists" in the Kwangtung 
Army ignored Tokyo, gaining leverage and self-assurance, and 
usurped Manchuria from the Chinese for the Imperial Way. In 
short, the Mukden Incident surprised many, yet when one considers 
the loosening grip of Tokyo's governing ability and Marshal Chang 
Hsueh-liang's effort to hinder the Kwangtung Army's holdings in 
Manchuria, Mukden may not be such a surprise. 
Tradition vs. Modernity 
Before Meiji Japan, clans of samurai fought for and ruled 
much of the island nation. This tradition was not eliminated 
with political reforms during Meiji. A "genro" class of elite 
military figures, beginning from the Meiji Restoration until the 
end of WWII, influenced and advised the emperor and government 
policy makers. This genro class was an obstacle to those who 
wanted to relate to nations of the world in a modern diplomatic 
and peaceful fashion. In opposition to the genro, the 
"modernists" were interested in economic development, 
particularly industrialization, trade and commerce, and foreign 
capital infusions. 
An example of a leader who was influenced by the genro 
philosophies was Tanaka Giichi, Prime Minister. He elected to 
forgo public education (a Meiji reform) in order to study at a 
samurai-influenced, clan school. He later joined the army and 
fought in the Russo-Japanese War. 2 
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Arthur Tiedmann, writing the introduction to James W. 
Morely's edited collection Japan Erupts: The London Naval 
Conference and the Manchurian Crisis, offered an example of the 
Hamaguchi cabinet's effort to "check" the military in order to 
obtain certain economic "goals.'' The cabinet wanted success at 
the London Naval Conference not only because Japan's expenditures 
on armaments would decrease, but because the "good will thus 
generated would predispose the Westerners to aid in Japan's 
fundamental economic problems." 3 
For such a victory, though, Japan had to overrule the Navy's 
military objectives. This power play did not pay off for the 
"modernists" because the military eventually won popular support; 
the Japanese feared the loss of their stake in China. Tiedmann 
concluded: 
If larger events (economic hardship, world depression) 
had not supervened, this gamble might have been carried 
off. To this boiling domestic social discontent was 
added a growing concern that Shidehara's China policy 
was a failure and would cost Japan its economic 
interests in China (Manchuria). In this atmosphere the 
Navy General Staff's charges against the Hamaguchi 
cabinet gained currency and became the central element 
in the great spurt in growth of ultranational 
organizations and propaganda that occurred in 1930. 4 
This dilemma, whether to rely on traditional approaches to 
policy or trust in a new world order, was personally 
characterized by Tanaka and Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro. 
General Tanaka Giichi, as characterized by historian Ian 
Nish, was a man who believed strongly in 'positive action' as 
opposed to •weak-kneed action', a trait he associated with the 
foreign minister he succeeded, Shidehara Kijuro. 5 Although 
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Tanaka dominated Japan's foreign relations for only two years, 
was forced to resign and was replaced by Shidehara, his 
influence, and those who had shaped his thinking, left a shadow 
that "fell across the Mukden incident and the catastrophic events 
that followed it. 116 
A pillar in many Tokyo governments, Shidehara's advocacy of 
modern and civil diplomacy gained him respect abroad but mixed 
results at home. The genre feared Shidehara because of his 
conciliatory position on China. Shidehara viewed China as a 
necessary partner in Japan's expansionist desires. He wrote in 
1924: "to secure overseas markets ... can only be done by 
diplomacy. If we try to cure our economic problems by 
territorial expansion, we will merely destroy international 
cooperation ... 117 Bamba's "Traditionalist vs. Modernist" thesis 
and the Tanaka-Shidehara comparison offer an interpretation that 
shows Japan's split-thinking when it came to expansion--
militaristic expansion or simple economic expansion. 
Tanaka advocated a strong arm. He was an army man who had 
fought in the Russo-Japanese War and wanted "to enhance Japan's 
position in the world at large. 118 Worried that China's internal 
instability would destroy Japanese hopes in Manchuria, Tanaka 
favored Chang Tso-lin as the best Chinese leader with whom Japan 
could work. Tanaka's willingness to intervene in China's civil 
war, by sending troops to prevent China from moving closer to 
Manchuria, eventually backfired. China's hate for Japan as an 
aggressor grew and the Chinese effectively boycotted Japan's 
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goods. 9 
Shidehara faced the same dilemma as Tanaka but pushed for a 
softer line, always consulating with Nanking on issues. 
Shidehara took into consideration the negative aspects of 
intervention and strong arm tactics. 
Considering the split in policy thinking, Seki Hiroharu 
explained why the military was willing to risk failure and seize 
Manchuria. He asserted that officers in the Kwangtung Army 
viewed Manchuria as "a holy land" because it was "consecrated by 
the sacrifice of one hundred thousand brothers who shed their 
blood in the war led by the great Meiji emperor. 1110 Officers 
viewed Manchuria as a vital area because of the "inevitable" war 
with the United States. The Kwangtung's Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ishiwara Kanji, one of the officers who eventually planned the 
Manchurian Incident, said in a written report: " ... if we are to 
prepare for war with the United States, we should not hesitate to 
seize political control in Manchuria and Mongolia at once." 
Ishiwara also believed that Japan's take-over of Manchuria would 
"extinguish anti-Japanese agitation in China. " 11 
The beliefs of the Kwangtung Army, and often the views of 
the military and genro class, conflicted directly with 
"modernist" diplomats who desired comity and friendly relations 
as a means to Japan's nation-building. It was this conflict, and 




Japan's interest in Manchuria focused on relief, the type of 
comfort a frontier offered to a crowded, economically dependent, 
and strategically anxious island nation. 
Emigration Interests: After being "opened" to Western 
commerce and finding themselves far behind Western technology, 
Japan reacted quickly to gain equal status with the world's more 
powerful nations. Yet, for a society based on agriculture, the 
transition was difficult. Japan was forced to urbanize, 
industrialize and limit its increasing population in order to 
compete with the West. Considering Japan's increasing birth rate 
in the 1800 1 s and its population doubling in the 1900's, 
Commodore Perry's visit, at least to the Japanese, seems to have 
been poorly timed. 
Japan in East Asia, a book printed in 1939 in England for 
private distribution, outlined the desperate circumstances that 
confronted Japanese society since its industrialization. It 
stated: 
Japan is a country small in area, even smaller than 
the single state of Texas, and yet she possesses a vast 
population of nearly one hundred million, which is 
steadily expanding at the rate of almost one million a 
year. The population of Japan proper has doubled in 
the last sixty years. The density of population per 
square mile of arable land in Japan in 1930 was 2490, 
which is twice as great as that of Belgium, the most 
densely populated country in Europe, and over four 
times that of England. 12 
This report confirmed Japan's prolific birth rate in the 1930's, 
even though it was not as high as the Soviet Union's. 
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The demand created by so many Japanese, given few natural 
resources, forced Japan to look to other areas of the world to 
either buy its goods or accept its people, thus relieving some of 
its population burden. The dilemma was not easily solved and 
racial discrimination against Japanese in the U.S. and Great 
Britain complicated Tokyo's efforts in finding a solution. 
In the 1930 1 s just over 30 million people lived in Manchuria 
(one-third the population of Japan), a combination of mainly 
Manchu and Han Chinese, but including Koreans, Japanese and 
Russians. Manchuria's land size, almost three times that of 
Japan's, was of obvious interest to Tokyo. 13 W.R. Crocker, in 
a 1932 publication The Japanese Population Problem, stated the 
case for Japanese emigration, an attitude the Japanese had taken 
to decades earlier. He wrote: 
Not only do the Japanese show a capacity for 
emigrating, but emigration can reduce the pressure of 
numbers in Japan because the birth-rate is falling and 
the conception of the standard of life is rising. 
Since she will be greatly needing some such temporary 
relief, emigration clearly must become a serious matter 
for her statesmen.M 
Crocker concluded, after a case-by-case analysis of possible 
emigration destinations, that four areas were most suitable for 
the Japanese--North Eastern Asia, Borneo, the South Pacific 
Islands, and Brazil. 15 The need for emigration along with the 
advantages of developing Manchuria into a Japanese economic link 
directed much of Tokyo's attention to Manchuria. 
Economic Interest: Marius B. Jansen claimed that Manchuria 
"was Japan's only frontier. 1116 Manchuria was a land ready to 
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absorb Japan's gusto of money, army, people and machinery. Chao 
Kang's study, The Economic Development of Manchuria: The Rise of 
a Frontier Economy, detailed and graphed the investment and 
production Manchuria experienced in the early 1900's, in a large 
part because of the Japanese. 
The notion of frontier is one that also occupied the minds 
of American citizens in the 1800 1 s as well as British colonial 
pioneers. Like England (in gaining India, South Africa, etc.) 
and America (the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska), Japan could 
actually gain more land by acquiring Manchuria. 
In Manchuria, resources were "exploitable" and ready for 
Japan's development. Many industries and investments increased 
in value and gave profitable returns. For example, in Chao's 
study of soya bean production, the export value of soya beans 
from Manchuria (in constant 1934 yuan) in 1891 was 25 million, in 
1915, 107 million, and in 1929 it was 255 million. This is one 
of many examples in Chao's study which showed the influence of 
Japan's effort to increase production and return. 
As might be expected of a frontier economy, Manchuria 
required much capital to develop its industries, especially its 
rail system. Naturally, Japan supplied much of Manchuria's 
demand and because of its interest in developing the area, most 
of the trade surplus was reinvested in Manchuria.IT This 
practice was intensified with the founding of Manchukuo. 
After 1931 economic development took on a new perspective, 
one that fitted the miliary's objective. G. C. Allen, writing in 
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A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, reasoned this as well: 
The industries that were introduced into Manchukuo, or 
were extended after the establishment of that State, 
were chiefly branches of the metallurgical and chemical 
industries--the war industries--and all forms of 
industrial investment in that country were strictly 
controlled and were supplied up to 1937 by or through 
the South Manchuria Railway Company or companies in 
which the Manchukuo and Jafsanese Governments held a 
large part of the capital. 8 
In anticipation of war, the Japanese put out a five year 
plan in 1937 which showed Manchukuo's integral role in their 
empire. The plan called for Tokyo to invest 2.5 billion yen in 
Manchukuo and 6 billion in the home islands on various defense 
projects, one of which was to increase the number of its 
airplanes to 10,000. 19 Manchukuo' s emphasis after 1935 was to, 
in Allen's words, "try to build up her equipment rapidly in 
preparation for war. " 20 
Strategic and Ideologic Interests: w. R. Crocker stated the 
importance of Manchuria to an aspiring power in the Far East: 
Lying, as it does, at the point where the 
territories of Russia, China, and Japan converge, it 
has an obvious strategical importance. Lying, too, 
between Japan and China, an unfilled land of rich 
resources, as large in area as three Japans, between 
the crowded populations of the two first Oriental 
Powers, its economic importance is no less obvious. 
The strategic and economic incitements to possess it, 
or to prevent a rival from possessing it, have been 
dangerously exacerbated by the ambiguities of its 
juridical status. 21 
Japan did "possess" Manchuria finally, or at least win war 
concessions and special rights from China and Russia in order to 
control it. Subsequent to the signing of treaties, Japan 
invested quickly and ambitiously in Manchuria. Non-zaibatsu 
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companies like Nissan gained their first real profits from the 
frontier land. Japan's control of the South Manchuria Railway 
(SMR) became a catalyst for Japanese economic development. 
Author A. Morgan Young, in 1938, described the SMR's rail 
construction, reaching nearly every part of Manchuria, as 
"continually putting out fresh tentacles. 1122 This investment in 
the SMR, the industries it reached and the manufactures and 
agriculture it transported, became quite personal to the proud 
Japanese. Young stated: 
... it was always "the blood and treasure poured out 
on the plains of Manchuria" that was invoked, creating 
Japan's indefeasible claims to whatever she might 
require in that region. Invested capital riveted her 
position, but sentimental claim always came first. 23 
Strategically, Manchuria became the buffer zone that kept 
Russia and China further (especially after 1931) from the 
Japanese home islands, but more importantly Manchuria became an 
idea held in the public image, an ideological claim vital to 
Japan's hope for the future.~ In this sense, Japan looked to 
Manchuria, and later Manchukuo, not only as a vital strategic 
area, but as its own "blood and treasure." 
Until the Mukden Incident and the Lytton Commission Report 
for the League of Nations, the U.S. was willing to allow Japan 
considerable freedom in Manchuria. The Washington Conference's 
limitations on naval build-up and Secretary of state stimpson's 
"non recognition" letter of Manchukuo changed that stance. Yet, 
at the turn of the century, President Theodore Roosevelt, 
burdened by racial discrimination against Japanese in the U.S., 
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emphasized the tight-rope America walked with Japan concerning 
East Asia: 
The vital interest of Japan on the other hand, is 
in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our 
interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria 
which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or 
without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a 
menace in however slight a degree, to their 
interests ••. ~ 
To summarize Japan's interest in Manchuria, no one does it 
better than the propagandists themselves, as Young recounted 
their arguments here: 
Manchuria is a No Man's Land and never was part of 
China. 
Strategically, Manchuria in the hands of a 
potential enemy threatens Japan's existence. 
Economically, Manchuria is necessary to Japan's 
existence. 
Only by Japan's action was Manchuria saved from 
annexation by Russia. 
Japan's sacrifices of blood and treasure give her 
rights in controlling the destinies of Manchuria such 
as no other country possesses. 
Japan's economic interests and investments in 
Manchuria cannot be allowed to be jeopardized by her 
own inaction or her neighbors' hostility.M 
From 1905 on, the Japanese dreamed of a Manchuria that would 
save the home islands. Manchuria offered a frontier in which to 
emigrate, invest, produce, export, and buffer Japan's 
adversaries. In 1927 Japan looked to Manchuria clearly as its 
own; it was willing to defend Manchuria if civil unrest unseated 
the stability Japan desired. Even when considering the strong 
role Japan played in Manchuria in protecting its interests and 
special rights, Japan never went so far as to annex Manchuria by 
means of engaging China in war. Yet in 1931, Manchuria, which 
then included the Jehol province, would separate itself from the 
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Chinese Nationalist government. This act of independence was not 
brought about by Chang Hsueh-liang but by the Kwangtung Army. 
Radical Militarism and the Mukden Incident 
Threats to the interests Japan fervently held in Manchuria, 
considering the Kwangtung Army's presence there, obviously caught 
the attention of Roosevelt and Chang Tso-lin, as well as his son, 
the Young Marshall. Japan viewed Manchuria as a vital economic 
possession. Japan was willing to protect its investment in 
Manchuria, especially considering unstable Chinese politics. 
These were the feelings in Tokyo. The feelings were even 
stronger, and more radically held in Manchuria. Threats to the 
Kwangtung Army's influence in Manchuria were greatly feared among 
its officers. The Kwangtung still feared a Russian advance, but 
more so, a strong Manchu warlord . 
Yoshihashi Takehiko, in his book Conspiracy at Mukden: The 
Rise of the Japanese Military, presented an excellent, in-depth 
narrative of events which led to the Mukden Incident, 18 
September 1931. Where Yoshihashi takes 150 pages to trace the 
events that culminated in the Incident, let me present a short 
summary analysis based on his account. Seki Hiroharu, in 
Morely's Japan Erupts, also presented a detailed analysis of the 
events leading up to the Manchurian Incident. 
China had fallen into regional factions dominated by 
warlords when the Manchu Dynasty fell in 1911. The Manchurian 
warlord, Chang Tso-lin eventually controlled Peking (renamed 
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Pei-ping when Nanking became the capital) as well as Manchuria's 
three Eastern Provinces. Chang had left soldiers in Manchuria 
but Japan was well established there as well. 
Japan's influence in North China became firmly grounded 
after defeating Russia in 1904 and gaining Russia's rights to 
economic activity, military support and important railway lines. 
While Chang was in Pei-ping, Tokyo honored him as the leader of 
Manchuria and was successfully negotiating with him to build new 
rail lines. Tokyo also negotiated with Chiang Kai - shek in 
Nanking. When Marshall Chang was forced out of Pei-ping the 
Kwangtung acted on its own, disregarding Tokyo's recognition of 
Chang. A year earlier, sensing potential conflict, military 
commanders moved Japanese military headquarters from Port Arthur 
inland to Mukden. 
Premier Tanaka made two statements in 1927, one legitimizing 
the use of force in Manchuria and the other suggesting that Tokyo 
will always recognize Chang Tso-lin's rule in North China. To 
the Army these statements may have presented a contradiction; 
they saw Chang Tso-lin, and later Chang Hsueh-liang as threats to 
Japan's interest in Manchuria. At the end of the Second Eastern 
Regions Conference Tanaka outlined eight points to Japan's 
position in Manchuria, here are the last four: 
5. It is clear that lawless elements in China will 
from time to time disrupt the peace, causing 
unfortunate international incidents. It is expected 
that the Chinese regime and the awakened people will 
suppress these rebellious elements and restore peace 
and order. However, Japan will have no choice other 
than to resort to measures of self-defense should 
Japan's rights and interests or the life and property 
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of the Japanese residents be jeopardized. 
Moreover, in order to impress on the Chinese the 
nature of Japan's rights, Japan must act against those 
elements who wantonly instigate anti-Japanese campaigns 
and the boycott of Japanese goods by spreading false 
rumors. 
6. Since Manchuria and Mongolia and particularly 
the Three Eastern Provinces (Heilungkiang, Kirin, and 
Liaoning) affect in the gravest way Japan's existence 
as a nation, Japan feels responsible for the 
maintenance of peace and the economic development of 
these areas. 
7. Japan must count on the efforts of the people of 
these three provinces for the maintenance of peace and 
order there. She will support any regime deemed 
capable of fostering political stability, which would 
also respect Japan's special interests. 
8. Should the spreading of the civil war into 
Manchuria and Mongolia jeopardize Japan's special 
rights and privileges, Japan must be ready to deal 
swiftly with any faction threatening her rights so that 
these regions may be maintained as safe and suitable 
areas for development by local and foreign 
residents.n 
One month later he offered this: 
... I say that deciding on a rigid course of action 
vis-a-vis a nation such as China whose domestic 
situation is constantly in a state of flux is simply 
not feasible. Our government is taking the position 
that we negotiate with Chang Tso-lin so long as he 
prevails in the north and likewise with Chiang Kai-shek 
so long as he is in control of the south. 3 
Communication gaps, let alone differences in philosophy, 
between Tokyo and Mukden may have been cause enough for radicals 
in the Kwangtung to seek their own solutions to strategic 
threats. Premier Tanaka sent little solace to his troops in 
Manchuria concerning Chang's imminent return. Theoretically, 
Chang had been the ruler of Manchuria while he was in Pei-ping 
and Tokyo was prepared to recognize him as the ruler in Mukden. 
But to Kwangtung officers, especially men like General Muraoka, 
Colonel Komoto, Major Tomiya, Colonel Itagaki and Lt. Colonel 
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Ishihara, the threat of Chang in Mukden was enough to force his 
death. Seiichi Teiichi, an army assistant, wrote this: "We knew 
that the execution of the plan called for circumspection and 
finesse, since it was obvious that no minister in Tanaka's 
cabinet would support such a plan."~ 
Despite Chang's train from Pei-ping being heavily guarded 
and Chinese rail patrols having been alerted, Major Tamiya 
successfully bombed Chang's train at a bridge between the 
Shenyang and Huangkutun stations on June 4, 1928. 30 (A map 
charting the train route and bombing site follows this document as 
Appendix A. ) 31 News reached Tokyo and eventually Premier Tanaka 
was persuaded to the truth--that the Kwangtung had initiated and 
carried out Chang's assassination. After much debate, Tanaka 
decided to hold a trial by court-martial. Dissenters urged the 
Premier to retain Japan's legitimacy in world regard and not admit 
guilt but the Emperor's insistence on justice quieted the issue. 
The trial was controversial; the military was filled with unrest. 
Yoshihashi described the breaking point of the trial: 
... at the second meeting of the "Special Committee 
to Investigate the Death of Chang Tso-lin," Oba, an 
administrative official of the Kwangtung Territorial 
Government, testified that Ito Kenjiro and Staff Of 
ficer Komoto were the principal offenders. The meeting 
was thrown into such turmoil that Mori suspended it for 
the day. Even more alarming was the growing resentment 
of the general populace against the holding of the 
trial. Tension reached a point so critical that some 
feared outbreaks of violence. 
Tanaka was left with no choice but to bow to public 
sentiment and accept the formula suggested by the 
Minister of War, who proposed that the offenders be 
punished by administrative action. General Muraoka and 
Colonel Komoto were now charged with dereliction of 
duty, the specific charge being failure to post rail-
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road guards at a zone requiring protection.n 
This was a turning point for the Kwangtung Army. Of all the 
events in Kwangtung Army history, this convinced the Army that it 
could take matters into its own hands and disregard Tokyo. The 
Kwangtung Army had successfully pulled the cover over the eyes of 
Tokyo and escaped discipline. The Manchurian radicals had 
outsmarted an Emperor and a Premier. 
Coup attempts and assassinations followed Chang's Death. 
The March Plot and the Cherry Society {Sakura kai) kept Tokyo 
running scared. Extremism gained momentum, not only in the army, 
but throughout the nation. Despite Chang Hsueh-liang's 
occasional recognition of Tokyo, his efforts to build independent 
rail lines caused the Kwangtung to fear him even more. While the 
Young Marshall was in Pei-ping the army staged its most daring 
event. 
At this point the story differs. Manchukuo: The Founding of 
a New Nation, published in 1933 by the Japanese Chamber of 
Commerce in New York, offered only one explanation for the 
Kwangtung Army's take over after the rail bombing. It stated: 
On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Army in the South 
Manchurian Railway Zone, stationed there in accordance 
with the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of 1905, was forced to protect the railroad 
after Chinese troops attempted to blow it up. This 
led, during the following day, to a complete 
disintegration of the existent Chinese Government. 
Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, then actually responsible 
for the peace of Manchuria, was in Peiping, where he 
had been joined by many of the most important officials 
of the Three Eastern Provinces. Many officials, his 
and low, disappeared overnight, so that the Japanese 
Army had to take control to avoid complete anarchy. 
But the Japanese authorities immediately made it known 
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that they had no intention of assuming governmental 
authority in manchuria and they called upon local 
Chinese to organize themselves and to take over the 
responsibilities of maintaining order." 
Yoshihashi tells the story differently. Two events in the 
summer of 1931 prompted Kwangtung officers to act independently 
of Tokyo and Chang Hsueh-liang. 
One hundred Korean farmers were attacked by hundreds of 
rioting Chinese farmers, enraged over the issue of irrigation and 
land rights. Chinese authorities sided with the Chinese farmers. 
Japanese consulate officials became irate and the Japanese 
consular police stepped up their presence in the area, only to 
China's dislike.~ This skirmish with the Chinese embittered 
the Japanese. 
One other incident would finally tip the scales. Yoshihashi 
again stated: 
As the culmination of a long series of altercations 
between two nations, no other incident (than Nakamura's 
death) gave the military and ultranationalists in Japan 
a more persuasive argument in favor of using force to 
settle once and for all the outstanding issues 
pertaining to Manchuria." 
Nakamura Shintaro, a captain in the Kwangtung Army, was arrested 
by Chinese officers on 27 June 1931, alleged for spying. A week 
later, he and his group were executed, then cremated. A number 
of investigations were undertaken but the Army was outraged; 
secret plans, like unto Chang Tso-lin's assassination, were 
formulated within the higher ranks of the Kwangtung Army. 36 
Trouble loomed over Manchuria. By 12 September large 
military supplies were being transported to and readied in 
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certain locations. 37 Tokyo caught wind of a mounting crisis and 
dispatched messages advocating temperance and patience. 38 Yet 
in secret meetings officials were staging the event. Even when 
Tokyo's General Tatekawa Yoshitsugu wired Mukden telling of his 
arrival the next morning, the 18th, plans were not reconsidered. 
Lt. Colonel Ishihara emphasized this resolve: "In view of the 
decision reached at Mukden last night (to carry out the coup), we 
cannot well back out now (because of Tatekawa's arrival). We 
will have to go through with it. 1139 And that they did. 
A bomb exploded on the railway in Japan's territorial zone 
and the army mobilized. (A map showing the army's mobilization 
follows this document as Appendix B.) 40 Yoshihashi described 
Colonel Itagaki's call for force: 
Itagaki told Morishima that the army had been mobilized 
because an important Japanese right relating to the 
South Manchurian Railway had been violated, and asked 
him for the cooperation of the Consulate General. 
Morishima asked who had issued the mobilization order. 
Itagaki replied, "Since it was an emergency situation 
and the commanding officer was in Port Arthur, I issued 
the order in his behalf." Morishima repeatedly 
emphasized the necessity of seeking a peaceful solution 
by means of diplomatic negotiations. Itagaki became 
provoked and retorted harshly, "Does the Consulate 
General wish to interfere with the prerogative of the 
Imperial Command after it has been invoked?" Realizing 
the futility of arguing with army officers in such a 
high state of excitement, Morishima returned to the 
Consulate General and reported the entire affair to the 
Consulate General. 41 
In the days and months following the initial explosion, 
Manchuria was seized by the Kwangtung Army. Nanking sought a 
policy of non-aggression. 
Recognizing the Kwangtung's intensity and independence, 
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Minister of War Minami stated: "Solutions of problems pertaining 
to Manchuria should be sought at the local level and not between 
Nanking and Tokyo. 11° Foreign Minister Shidehara and other 
Tokyo officials were outraged at Minami's counter to diplomatic 
measures. 
Diplomacy was about to fail. Shidehara desperately tried to 
localize the crisis in Manchuria and salvage relations with 
China, but to no avail. China appealed to the League; Japan's 
offer for private negotiations with Nanking, in order to avoid 
global outrage against Japan, was declined. By November 16 the 
League demanded a Japanese withdrawal. Yet overpowered by the 
radicalism that swept the entire military, Shidehara was forced 
to ease his demands (in order to avoid a coup) and gave up 
insisting that the Kwangtung Army "comply with the League 
resolution and retreat within the railway zone.''c On 21 
December 1931, a provisional government was established in 
Manchuria. In February, 1932, Manchurian independence was 
declared and by the first of March, Manchukuo was established. 
One week later Henry Pu-yi was inaugurated as Chief Executive of 
the new nation. 
Manchuria's story may end here. Questions posed at the 
beginning of the paper now have answers. 
The citizens of Manchuria slept through the night on 18 
September 1931. A few probably heard occasional gunshots as the 
Japanese Kwangtung Army invaded China's North Barracks outside 
Mukden and set the Chinese on the run.~ By February and March 
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of 1932, they were persuaded though, and some quite anxious, to 
help the Japanese stabilize the area by forming a new government, 
Manchukuo. 
And yes, Japan benefitted from Manchukuo•s (and Manchuria's) 
resources, its railways, its productivity, its strategic 
location, its frontier, but this issue split the nation on the 
decision of how to go about "influencing" Manchuria. Eventually, 
to the Japanese, Manchuria became more than a favored trading 
nation, rather it became a "holy land," a hope, a security. 
Manchuria, and then Manchukuo, was the "blood and treasure" of 
Japan, and an integral part of Japan's expanding empire. 
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Appendix A 
~,·i.l h l\,'1111d1uri,1 
~,1ilwfl~ Co. 
!lie ol d, :111 wa ll 
v ( A1,,J..den 
Note: The approximate location from which Major T6miya deto nated the 
bomb is based on a diagram in Ozaki, Rik11,:un o l.,'gu ka shita Hitobito . p . 
I 07 . For a variant version . see Asahi. Taiheiyo , I, 307, where the location 
of the lever to actuate the bomb appears on the Commercial Di strict side 
of the tracks approximately 200 yards from the point at which the Peking-
Mukden Railwa y goe s under the tracks o[ the South Manchuria Railway . 
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Appendix B 
Chart oJ th-e mu-kJen, CJncufont 
Showi.,9 pri"cipt1I ~1t1ppe,1·1ir1gs t1'1d ttclions 
duri"g the night o( Septe,,,ber 18·19, 1931 
STAT U TE MILES 
l 
Dir.-cl;(l,1 of Marci, :: : 
Di.-tctio••orr-.,,. 
Rerlica of Map No. 6, Lytton Report . 
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